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UNDERSTANDING GLOBALIZATION
Scholars of globalization studies have suffered from what could be called an
uneasy preoccupation with definitional issues. Naturally so, perhaps, when we
consider that it is still nearly impossible to attend a conference on globaliza-
tion without hearing globalization critics’ cries of “Haven’t you defined it yet?”
Books on the topic of globalization often carry a tone of apology for not being
able to offer a precise and generally agreed-on definition. Efforts to respond to
the need for definition may have, to some extent, delayed scholarly inquiry
from moving in what could be a more fruitful direction, namely, looking at
globalization’s interaction with other forces and subsequent impacts. For those
still preoccupied with definitions, an approach that looks at these interactions
might well serve as a more effective way of clarifying the essential nature of
globalizing phenomena.
Approaching globalization in an interaction context highlights the large
extent to which it is a dynamic and contingent process. It has been often
pointed out that globalization is not so much a prevailing condition as it is a
process (Cerny, 1996; Clark, 1997; Giddens, 2000; Held, McGrew, Goldblatt,
& Perraton, 1999; Rosenau, 1997). It is, moreover, a process that shifts, surges,
and feeds on dynamic relationships. It is not, in other words, a constant process
with unvarying sources. When history encourages liberation from conceptual
jails (such as existing paradigms that we cling to as identities) or policy jails
(such as certain polarity structures), a booming of interactions between global
actors—including individuals—becomes salient. These periods of increased
interaction can be considered as surges in the long history of globalization.
Moreover, when individual and collective actors experience globalization, they
not only go through transformations themselves, but they also reshape the
globalization processes with which they interact. For example, the reactions of
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major states to globalization are likely to foster new dynamics that, in turn,
may serve as inputs for altered relationships and interactions between actors
and situations.
Observing and analyzing globalization are most feasible when done in
conjunction with probes of major issues and factors in world politics. Thus,
you have not read many attempts to define globalization in this volume.
Rather its chapters sought to go beyond definition, to explore the interaction
of globalization with other major dimensions of international affairs—most
notably, with security and the nation-state.
WHY GLOBALIZATION AND SECURITY
SHOULD BE STUDIED TOGETHER
Studying globalization and security separately can first be seen as unproduc-
tive in the sense that separate agendas do not contribute to the comprehensive
accumulation and integration of knowledge. Such an agenda is also impracti-
cal in light of the realities of world politics. Most people would agree that
processes of accelerated global interactions are bringing countries and regions
closer together and creating a growing web of ties both geographically and
functionally. These ties lead to new and transformed types of security issues.
For example, factors such as the skill revolution, authority crises, and an orga-
nizational explosion, feed into so-called “fragmegrative” sources of instability,
such as technological, transportation, organizational and economic revolu-
tions, and foster pressure for the diffusion of authority (Rosenau, 1997).
Even traditional security establishments, which for a long time ignored
globalizing processes as a major consideration in their planning, now recognize
that globalization is indeed having a profound impact on current and future
security affairs (Kugler & Frost, 2001). While in some cases the processes of
globalization may lessen security dangers, they may also magnify others. The
9/11 attacks are an obvious example in this regard. These attacks revealed the
globalization of terror, and showed how globalization may give rise to new
military missions, purposes, and priorities in a more global context.
Additionally, the concepts of globalization and security are related at the-
oretical levels of analysis. There cannot be a preferred level of analysis for glob-
alization studies, since such phenomena unfold at virtually every level and in
nonlinear formats. When considering interactions between globalization and
security, therefore, it is possible to go beyond the traditional distinction
between external and internal—a natural outcome of the state-centric para-
digm—which has had a limiting effect on the study of International Relations
(IR). While traditional security issues have been largely occupied with exter-
nal threats, with the advance of globalization, security issues and challenges
have become increasingly transnational and multilevel. Security studies must
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speed up its efforts to find ways of further conceptualization of multilevel and
nonlinear understandings.
GLOBALIZATION AND SECURITY STUDIES
The concepts of globalization and security have, directly or indirectly, been
considered together in various studies. Many works have argued, for example,
that globalization produces further complications for security agendas, thus
placing a heavy emphasis on the negative consequences of globalization (e.g.,
Cha, 2000; Clark, 1999; Guehenno, 1998; Rodrik, 1997; Scholte, 2000; and
Zangl & Zurn, 1999). One could also include in this list most of the contri-
butions to the three-volume work edited by Kugler and Frost (2001). Even
Friedman’s The Lexus and the Olive Tree (2000), generally a pro-globalization
book, admits that globalization does not necessarily foster integration or sta-
bility.
Studies that have in some way discussed the concepts of globalization and
security together can generally be grouped into three main types: policy-ori-
ented studies, socioeconomic studies, and IR studies. Policy-oriented studies
(e.g., Kugler & Frost, 2001; Mackinlay, 2002) have been largely produced in
response to the ‘new’ security/insecurity challenges of the present era. These
studies, often commissioned by state-supported institutions, seem to assume
that the new security challenges are the result of advancing globalization. As
such, they attempt to provide policy answers or state strategies to meet these
challenges. Also within this strand of research, it is possible to find studies
examining the role that technology has played in the development of the cur-
rent international system (e.g., O’Hanlon, 2000; Skolnikoff, 1993). A general
theme of this type of inquiry focuses on how scientific research was at the serv-
ice of the state in the twentieth century and how this cooperation may now be
changing with the advance of globalization and the global spread of technol-
ogy as a resource of actors other than states.
A second strand of studies that indirectly brings together the concepts of
globalization and security are those that pursue a socioeconomic approach.
These studies (e.g., Beck, 2000; Giddens, 2000) view globalization as leading
to major socioeconomic transformations that generally produce insecurities for
domestic/societal and international actors of world politics. This strand has
operationalized the relationship between globalization and security in two pri-
mary ways. The first of these is that uneven development will create conflict.
Particularly at the national level, globalization critics find a direct correlation
between globalization-fed corporate profits and global poverty. Poverty is seen
as a major source of conflict since national security has increasingly been
equated with economic security (Flanagan, 2001). At the national level, glob-
alization produces rising elites and a middle class, both of which demand
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bigger shares of the pie than other segments of society. When the gap between
these groups grows, the result may be antigovernment movements (e.g., China
and Iran) and even violent conflicts (e.g., Indonesia). The second major per-
spective is that unchecked economic globalization leads to global economic
crises that can be devastating for developing state economies. For example, the
speed, volatility, and sudden withdrawals of financial flows led some countries
into serious recession during the 1997–1998 Asian crisis (Rothkopf, 2001;
Stiglitz, 2002).
Yet another example that could be considered in this second group, one
that emphasizes the social dimensions of economic factors, is that of Hunt-
ington’s clash of civilizations (1993). He predicted that violence resulting from
international anarchy and the absence of common values and institutions
would erupt among and between civilizations rather than among and between
states. His argument raises the additional question of whether statehood is
losing its primacy with respect to the future of international conflict. The gen-
eral perspective is that more interaction means more conflict, and more inter-
action stems from more globalization. For a similar argument based on a clear
connection between globalization and conflict on the one hand and religious
and cultural identity on the other, see Johnston (2001).
The third strand of studies on globalization and security involves concep-
tualizations of IR. Some of these works are interested in understanding how
traditional security dilemmas have been affected by the dynamics of globaliza-
tion. Others focus on how the international system and its primary actors—
traditionally considered to be states—are affected when attempting to cope
with globalizing dynamics. Examples of this type of work include those by
Clark (1997); Held, McGrew, Goldblatt, & Perraton (1999); Rosenau (1997);
Scholte (2000); and Sorensen (2001).
Yet another cluster of IR studies is focused on economic globalization and
security. Although such works may seem more closely tied with the socioeco-
nomic strand, the types of research questions they ask (e.g., what is the rela-
tionship between economic interdependence and conflict?) help keep them in
line with an IR perspective. Two general types of methodological directions are
taken in these works. The first are those historical studies, many of which have
been highly influenced by world systems theory and Lenin’s imperialism
theory. The second group is of a largely comparative and quantitative nature
(e.g., Barbieri & Schneider, 1999; Dorussen, 1999; Gowa, 1994; Mansfield,
1994; Mansfield & Pollins, 2001).
Within all types of globalization and security studies, in fact, those with
economic dimensions seem to be the most numerous. This is perhaps to be
expected since, even before globalization studies began to accelerate in the
1990s, there was already an IR research agenda on interdependence and con-
flict. Often interdependence then came to be equated with globalization. Since
economic dimensions were generally seen as the first factors to expand as a
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result of interdependence and globalization, both of these concepts were first
identified and presented in terms of their economic aspects.
The works in this volume can be considered as fitting within the third, or
IR, strand of studies incorporating concepts of globalization and security.
While an extensive literature has often linked these two concepts, it has been
pointed out that work still needs to be done to more fully develop the concep-
tual connections between globalization and security (Cha, 2000). The diverse
literature on these matters could well be strengthened by the development of
a taxonomy consisting of key variables that sustain the relationship between
these dynamics. Primary causalities could be hypothesized and explored in
more depth, and all of this is best done without paying heed to disciplinary
boundaries or limiting levels of analysis.
A major aim of the chapters in this volume, therefore, was to contribute
to further conceptualizing and operationalizing of the relationship between
security and globalization. In consideration of the preceeding chapters and in
conjunction with the broader literature outlined earlier, it becomes possible to
distinguish certain emergent conceptual links, which may serve as starting




Three initial issues seem to provide an appropriate framework within which to
link the phenomena embraced by globalization and security. The first of these
issues is “change.” One of the greatest challenges now addressed in security
studies involves the processes of change and the uncertainty they can generate
in global affairs. With security often understood as an aspect of control, main-
taining the status quo, mastering it, or adapting to it thus becomes one of the
primary aims of actors in the international system. Changing environments
and the resulting insecurities have become a primary research inquiry for secu-
rity studies.
At the same time, change can be seen as very much a factor associated
with globalization. However one may choose to define globalization (e.g.,
acceleration and constriction of historical trends, universalization/diffusion of
world values and traditions, or rapidly growing and uneven cross-border flows
of goods, services, people, money, technology, information, ideas, culture,
crime, and weapons), change is likely to be treated as a central feature of the
processes that unfold. Globalization has thus been a constant source of the
change and uncertainty that have inspired security studies in the post–Cold
War era. By studying the changes in security wrought by globalization,
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research can benefit and help generate an accumulation of generalizable
knowledge on world affairs.
Power
Security studies have also long been preoccupied with the concept of power,
which provides a second useful issue on which to base a conceptualization of
the links between globalization and security. Since reconfigurations of power
distribution and their implications in the international arena often lead to con-
flict, they have always been a primary research focus of security. Power recon-
figurations present a conceptual linkage between globalization and security in
the sense that globalization tends to generate new contexts both at the national
and international level for power reconfigurations, or what might be called
shifting spheres of authority. Examples of how authority is shifting can be seen
in the conduct of international terrorist groups or organized-crime units,
which have been moving their activities increasingly from the national level
into the transnational arena. Other examples include some national level enti-
ties such as NGOs and business corporations, which were previously treated as
trivial in terms of their capacities but are now enjoying a greater degree of def-
erence at the expense of formerly unquestioned power centers such as state
security establishments.
Duality
A third reason why the links between globalization and security should be
studied is related to the ways in which globalization has generated a bifurca-
tion of global structures. Along with the advance of globalization studies, IR
scholarship has observed a duality between a traditional state-centric system
and an emerging multicentric one (Rosenau, 1990). While security and secu-
rity studies represent clear reflections of a state-centric world, globalization has
fostered and sustained a multicentric one. Perhaps most important to this for-
mulation is the idea that globalization and the emerging multicentric world
have not replaced the traditional foundations of the state-centric world. In
fact, a large scholarship—including several of the authors in this volume—now
implicitly or explicitly suggests that both worlds coexist, sometimes coopera-
tively, often conflictually, and always interactively. As Mittleman notes, inter-
national studies have entered an “interregnum between the old and the new”
(2002: 12).
In terms of security, globalization and the emerging multicentric world
have not eliminated traditional geopolitical concerns and conceptualizations.
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The images and understandings of the state-centric world are still very much
preoccupied with traditional security considerations such as the primacy of
state interests, state-to-state alliances, balancing against threat as well as many
lingering geopolitical conflicts over geography, military competition, and
ethnic issues. On the other hand, the advent of globalization and the multi-
centric world have created several alterations of the traditional security con-
cepts at various levels.
Both conceptually and as policy issues, in short, stability and security
emerge as significant research challenges within this dualistic epoch—an
epoch that has been characterized by innovative terminology such as “frag-
megration” (Rosenau, 1997) (fragmentation and integration), “glocalization”
(Robertson, 1995) (globalization and localization), or “chaord” (Hock, 1995)
(chaos and order). Hoffman (2002) draws on one of these characterizations: he
views the 1990s as a period dominated by the tension between the fragmenta-
tion of states that border on or slip into failure and the progress of economic,
cultural, and political integration fostered by globalization. He refers to 9/11
as the “bloody link” between the two worlds of interstate relations and global
society.
WHY THE STATE SHOULD BE INCORPORATED INTO
GLOBALIZATION AND SECURITY STUDIES
The foregoing discussion suggests possible links between the processes of
globalization and the processes of change, power reconfiguration, and systemic
duality. Likewise, the state itself can be relocated and reframed in terms of its
interaction with these three processes.
Duality and the State
In terms of duality, the emergence of a multicentric world has brought new
actors into the global arena alongside the states of the traditional state-centric
world. The globalization literature tends to talk about transnational non-
governmental actors (e.g., NGOs, corporations, and global civil society), global
governance structures (e.g., the United Nations, the IMF, and the World
Bank) and their roles in terms of controlling, taming, and managing global-
ization. Whether as the controllers of ‘chaos’ in the globalization era, or as
fine-tuners to meet changing global norms, states are still recognized widely as
actors that can and will continue to play important management roles. Taming
both the geopolitics and globalization of the current duality has been described
as a “key challenge of statecraft” (Flanagan, 2001: 10).
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If we accept that the state’s role remains important, we also need to ask
which states should be the focus of inquiry. The answer is that a research
agenda incorporating states, security, and globalization must be a truly global
one. Particularly after the events of 9/11, the lines between core and periphery
(in terms of security) have disappeared, weakening arguments of an insulated
duality between zones of conflict and zones of peace (Singer & Wildavsky,
1993). Insecurities in the periphery have the ultimate potential to threaten and
even hurt the core. Globalization, security, and the state studies cannot follow
the mistakes of IR in ignoring the periphery and arguing that small states do
not matter (Ayoob, 1998; David, 1997).
Globalization and the state literature has also questioned whether the
state itself is likely to remain the same, be transformed, or has already lost its
primary mission as a result of globalization. Though this debate is far from
concluded, a transformationalist strand, arguing that the state neither remains
the same nor has lost its strength but is transforming in response to globaliza-
tion, seems to be the most widely accepted interpretation. If this is so, such a
transformation would have significant consequences for security studies.
Depending on the way that the role of the state is conceived, security studies
may have to redefine its treatment of this ‘primary’ reference object.
Power, Change, and the State 
Within a duality as previously described, competing actors will emerge and,
subsequently, various shifts of power configurations are likely to follow. Stud-
ies should identify, for example, how the state will deal with such power recon-
figurations and also how it will manage to project its remaining capacities on
behalf of its international and regional missions (e.g., building up regional eco-
nomic organizations as well as security ones, such as ASEAN and MERCO-
SUR, are among the mechanisms states employ for this purpose). In general,
such reconfigurations affect the states themselves as well as their abilities and
choices in managing the changes they face in the new epoch.
While traditionally states could respond to many international phenom-
ena as unitary actors, globalization makes such responses less and less likely (an
inadequacy that itself presents a security challenge worthy of study). Rather it
is very likely that a variety of responses will emanate from the different agen-
cies of states and governments. In other words, the globalizing processes of
different segments of a nation-state might evoke different reactions from its
various parts that result in domestic power shifts and reconfigurations. For
example, a state’s business sector might take advantage of globalization and
thereby gain power vis-à-vis other state branches such as the bureaucracy or
the political elite.
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Even in the most developed countries, which are supposed to be manag-
ing and adapting best to globalization, one can observe this variation. In the
case of the U.S. government, for example, security, economic, science and tech-
nology, and law enforcement policies essential to coping with the challenges of
the global era are still developed largely in isolation from one another (though
the recent construction of the Homeland Security Department implies that
there is awareness of the need for change).
The situation is even more problematic when it comes to less developed
countries. Here one can see even clearer fault lines between various state seg-
ments. It is not surprising, therefore, that foreign service bureaucracies or busi-
ness elite of some governments in the developing world, such as Russia, China,
Turkey, and Iran, have been involved with different dimensions of globaliza-
tion than have these countries’ armed forces. The number of varying categories
of relationships with globalization can rise exponentially when you look at the
individual level (see, e.g., the “12-worlds” in Rosenau, 2003).
If the state is not ready institutionally to transform itself and adapt in
order to accommodate globalization, political and economic stability could
suffer, leading to a growth in corruption and bribery, or even criminal net-
works. The Russian case may be seen as an example here. Its more aggressive
units, such as clandestine networks, have taken advantage of globalization and
manipulated the “opening up” unchecked by the political authority. The atten-
tion-grabbing ability of these groups helps to give the impression that global-
ization may benefit these groups more than less violent ones. Ultimately, these
developments could confuse public opinion about whether globalization is
positive or negative. In turn, the state may become distracted from a necessary
focus on the management of globalization.
All of this seems to imply that states may be increasingly insecure in this
new globalizing world that requires at least a modicum of transformation
some states are often not prepared to make. Thus, there can be a pervasive
sense of losing control (for a compelling account of this phenomenon, see Del
Rosso, 1995). Moreover, it is increasingly evident that the costs of the negative
consequences are high if states are not well prepared to directly confront and
manage the negative challenges. For example, 9/11 and the global insurgence
of terrorism revealed how states and the state system were not ready for such
challenges, both conceptually (not expecting the attack from a multicentric
actor) and also practically (see T.V. Paul, this volume). Perhaps the best exam-
ple of this dualistic structure in world politics with respect to security can be
seen in the war on terrorism. If individuals without clear state support or
involvement can pose a security challenge to which the state system is having
difficulty responding with traditional state tools, it clearly indicates the coex-
istence of dual worlds. It then follows that we must find a way of studying the
globalization/security relationship within this dualistic worldview.
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CONCLUSION
I have argued here for the need to study globalization and security in con-
junction, and have offered three conceptual tools as a step toward an opera-
tionalization in future studies. I have also proposed that globalization and
security studies could benefit from a concentration on the state as a useful plat-
form for reflecting what happens when globalizing dynamics meet with tradi-
tional and new security issues. The state is thus a litmus test for exploring what
happens when globalization and security converge.
The works in this volume sought to draw links between the concepts of
globalization, security, and the nation-state. In doing so, the various chapters
explored the connections between security and global transformations and the
changes in state structures in response to the emergent connections. As such,
the combined results of this volume represent starting points in a conceptual
linking of security and globalization, in identifying how the state concept pro-
vides a common ground for studying the interaction of globalization and secu-
rity, and in projecting the possible effects of this conceptual convergence on
the international system.
Attempts to consider large concepts such as globalization, security, and
the state in conjunction with one other but without guiding tools will run the
obvious risk of becoming lost—an unfortunate result reflected in the often dis-
persed literature on these issues. Such a lack of coordination is especially likely
when these concepts are undergoing rapid change—both within themselves
and in their interactions with each other. Thus, we need to introduce guiding
conceptual tools to provide a focus to globalization and security studies. Dual-
ity, power, and change may offer a starting point for future research.
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